According to Walter Isaacson’s¹ authorized biography, this is what Steve Jobs had to say about Apple’s lawsuit against HTC in 2011:

Our lawsuit is saying, “Google, you fucking ripped off the iPhone, wholesale ripped us off.” Grand theft. I will spend my last dying breath if I need to, and I will spend every penny of Apple’s $40 billion² in the bank, to right this wrong. I’m going to destroy Android, because it’s a stolen product. I’m willing to go to thermonuclear war on this.

Apple settled that lawsuit two years later, in 2012, a year after Jobs had passed. While that was the year when Apple arguably got the upper-hand on Google, it was not because of this settlement or by going thermonuclear on Android. 2012 was also the year Apple eschewed Google Maps by releasing its own completely in-house mapping solution.

The version of Apple Maps released with iOS 6 in September of 2012, was summarily and unanimously reviled. Here’s what David Pogue, then at The New York Times, had to say:

In short, Maps is an appalling first release. It may be the most embarrassing, least usable piece of software Apple has ever unleashed.

The critics weren’t wrong. Apple Maps was embarrassing and unusable, so much so that Apple sent out a formal letter of apology and then fired its mobile head of software for not signing it. Software-wise, there was no justification to ship Apple Maps in 2012. Strategy-wise however, there was no justification not to ship it.

Launching its own mapping service was Apple’s biggest gambit in its war with Google, way more than any lawsuit. The lawsuits were about iPhone verses Android and while many Android device makers did borrow liberally from iPhones and iOS, it turns out Apple’s fight with Google wasn’t really about one phone platform versus the other. It was about platforms versus services, and which one might commoditize the other. Up until Apple Maps, Google had the undeniable upper hand because it was a win-win for them as long as Apple had to use its services. Google would certainly win more if everyone suddenly started using Android, but they still won even if people stuck with iOS.

Maps in particular strengthened Google’s position. Apple’s original Maps app, using Google’s backend³, shipped as one of the twelve built-in apps on the very first iPhone. More than just a key feature, Maps was table stakes. By 2012, those table stakes increasingly meant including turn-by-turn navigation, a feature Apple’s app couldn’t support under the existing agreement with Google. With that agreement expiring at the beginning of 2013, an extremely confident Google used their advantage to push for more say in Apple’s app. They were so confident in their position of strength that they were apparently caught flatfooted when Apple announced the switch to their own mapping data.

Here’s what Nick Wingfield and Claire Cain Miller had to say at the time of the switch:

One reason that it will take Google some time to build the iPhone app: it expected the app with Google’s maps to remain on the iPhone for some time, based on the contract between the two companies, and was caught off guard when Apple decided to build a new application to replace the old one.

Google did release their own maps app on iOS later that same year in December. As embarrassing as it was for Apple that the terrible state of its own mapping service left people clamoring for Google to come to the rescue, that Google did come to the rescue was a victory for Apple. It proved that Google needed iOS, and specifically its users, so much so that they gave up on what would have been a huge competitive advantage for Android. Furthermore, it meant iPhone users could still get Google Maps, replete with vector tiles and turn by turn directions, all without Apple having to concede anything to Google. Apple was then free to then iterate and improve on its abysmal service until it genuinely became good enough.

Ending a reliance on a competitor for a table stakes feature wasn’t the only strategic gain Apple got from Apple Maps. The other, arguably more valuable and definitely more lucrative benefit is how Apple Maps shifted the power dynamic with that same competitor in Apple’s favor.

One bit of information that has come out of the DOJ’s antitrust trial is that Google pays Apple 18 billion dollars a year to remain the default search provider on Safari. While that deal applies to Safari across all of Apple’s platforms, the bulk of its price is for Safari on iOS. You might be wondering why the company whose browser dominates global browser share would be willing to pay so much to be the default search provider on a browser that barely scrapes past a 20% share on a good day. The reason is that most of the 20% is people browsing Safari on their iPhones in the U.S. In fact, so many people use iPhones in the U.S. that Safari has the largest mobile browser share here. That wouldn’t matter if Google were somehow merely just a platform or browser company, but Google doesn’t make its billions on Android or Chrome. They make it on advertising powered by Google search. Google is an ad tech company and in advertising, the U.S. is king.

In summary, Google has to pay Apple billions of dollars for three reasons:

1. Google is fundamentally an ad tech company.
2. Most advertising revenue comes from the U.S.
3. Safari, and not Chrome, is the dominant mobile browser in the U.S.

And there’s a fourth reason.

4. Apple Maps

Google would not be paying billions of dollars annually to be the search default in Safari if Apple needed something equally as important from them. The only thing Apple truly ever needed from Google was mapping data. With its own mapping data, Apple no longer needs anything of significance, and so Google has to pay.

Steve Jobs talked about going thermonuclear over Android, but he was wrong. While Google did commit “grand theft”⁴, Android wasn’t the right battlefield and revenge is a dish best served cold. Going thermonuclear on the thief in court was never going to be satisfying. Having that same thief over a barrel and paying you billions annually just for the mere privilege to be on the platform they stole in the first place?

Priceless.

Update: It was reported right after publishing (naturally) that testimony in the Google antitrust trial revealed Google pays Apple a whopping 36 percent of all search ad revenue that comes via Safari. As John Gruber pointed out, that is even higher than the maximum 30 percent Apple takes for some purchases made through its App Store. The thief is indeed over a barrel and while that’s technically a price, I suspect some of the feelings about this arrangement remain priceless.